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Abstract. We review the recent approaches to modelling financial markets based on
multi-agent systems. After a brief summary of the basic stylised facts observed in real-
market time-series we discuss some simple agent-based systems which are currently
used to model financial markets. One of the most prominent examples is here the
Minority Game (MG), which we address in some more detail. After a brief discussion
of its basic setup and general phenomenology we summarise the main findings of the
statistical mechanics analysis and discuss the emergence of stylised facts in extensions
of the MG near their phase transitions between efficient and predictable regimes. We
then turn towards more realistic variants which comprise heterogeneous populations of
agents, with different memory capabilities, different inclinations to trade and varying
expectations on the future evolution of the market. Finally we give a short outlook on
potential future work in this area.
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1. Introduction
The modelling of financial markets and other social systems by means of individual-
based simulations has attracted a significant amount of attention in recent years,
both in the economics and socio-economics community, as well as among statistical
physicists [4, 37, 55, 18, 24, 46, 58]. The range of phenomena to which this approach
is applied is broad, and includes not only the modelling of traders in financial markets,
but also opinion formation and decision dynamics, epidemic spreading, the behaviour
of crowds and pedestrians, as well as vehicular traffic and co-operative behaviour in
animal swarms [41, 42, 72, 7, 6]. The term ‘individual’ in individual-based approaches
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to the modelling of such systems may here stand for traders in a financial market,
cars on a highway or companies in an economic network. While practitioners often
make use of sophisticated models with a variety of different types of agents, statistical
physicists have become interested in minimalist models of such phenomena, which
ideally allow for analytical solutions. While the detail and complexity of more realistic
models often impedes analytical approaches, the reduced models considered by physicists
are often tractable with methods from statistical physics, and their behaviour can be
characterised analytically for example by exact or approximative calculation of their
phase diagrams. Furthermore the restriction to minimalist models allows one to focus
on the parameters and features of the model which are truly responsible for its behaviour
(e.g. by systematic adding or removal of individual features), whereas the underlying
mechanisms may be obscured and thus harder to detect in more sophisticated and
detailed models. Apart from the methodology, concepts of physics often allow one to
shed light on phenomena in adjacent fields and to address them from novel viewpoints.
The concepts of self-organised criticality [6] or replica symmetry breaking and the
corresponding rugged landscape picture of spin glass physics may here serve as examples
[67]. Agent-based models and models from statistical physics share common features in
that in both cases one is interested in complex co-operative behaviour on a macroscopic
scale emerging from relatively simple interactions at the microscopic level, i.e. between
the interacting agents. One may thus expect that techniques and methods developed
originally in the context of physics may be successfully employed in other disciplines
as well in order to study complex many-agent systems and their emergent collective
phenomena.
This review focuses on some such approaches in the context of the modelling of financial
markets by agent-based trading models. Although the statistical physics analysis is
limited to minimalist models, several such model systems have been seen to show
remarkably complex behaviour, including phase transitions, non-trivial co-operation and
global adaptation [18, 24, 46, 58]. From the point of view of the description of real-
world phenomena they also display what is referred to as ‘stylised facts’ in the economics
literature, namely anomalous non-Gaussian behaviour and fluctuations in their global
observables, similar to statistical features seen in real market data. This positions the
agent-based models considered by statistical physicists right at the boundary between
being analytically solvable and at the same time sufficiently realistic, and constitutes
some of the appeal of such models.
The objective of this chapter is to review some of the developments in the study of agent-
based models, stressing the emergence of anomalous behaviour. While some, potentially
non-representative focus is given to Minority Game market models and the authors’ own
work, we also present a brief discussion of some other related agent-based models.
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2. Overview and stylised facts in financial markets
2.1. Introduction
‘Stylised facts’ in the context of finance is a term used by theoretical economists and
by practitioners to summarise statistical features of time series generated by financial
markets. Most notably financial markets generate non-Gaussian time series with power-
law characteristics, long-range correlations in time, scaling behaviour and anomalous
fluctuations [58, 11]. Non-Gaussian behaviour is indeed found in many different contexts,
already more than 100 years ago, Vilfredo Pareto [66] pointed out that in numerous
countries and at various points in time the wealth distribution follows a power-law, i.e.
N ∼ w−α, where N is the number of people having wealth greater than w. Over the past
decades similar power-law behaviour has been detected in numerous other phenomena,
ranging from financial time series, to sand piles, the distribution of word frequency in
texts, citations of scientific papers, hits on web pages, firm sizes, populations of cities
so forth [6, 64].
Anomalous, non-Gaussian fluctuations are not only observed in the above systems,
apparently unrelated to physics, but also in systems of condensed matter physics, and
in models of statistical mechanics. Anomalous behaviour is here found in a variety of
contexts, from magnetic materials, over solutions of polymers, gels, glasses, fluid- and
superfluid helium, water at its boiling point, and even in experiments of elementary
particle physics and in cosmology [47, 76]. The common feature of these systems is that
they display phase transitions, i.e. depending on external control parameters (such as
temperature or pressure) the behaviour of one given system can be of different types. Not
only do the characteristics of these systems change drastically at their transition points,
but thermal fluctuations attain non-Gaussian features, very similar to those observed in
unphysical systems mentioned above. Close to their critical points systems of condensed
matter physics display long-range correlations, with an algebraic as opposed to an
exponential decay of spatial and temporal correlations, leading to large-scale collective
behaviour, ergodicity breaking and other so-called ‘anomalous’ characteristics. Power-
law correlation functions are here a reflection of scale-free behaviour of the system,
i.e. of fractal properties and self-similarity. This invariance under re-scaling of units
has led to the development of powerful methods of statistical physics, most notably of
renormalisation group, which allow to address critical phenomena efficiently [47, 76, 13].
2.2. Anomalous fluctuations in financial markets
Power-law statistics and non-Gaussian behaviour have been detected in a variety of
different markets, and are mostly independent of the specific trading rules or external
circumstances at the given market place [58]. For example, if we denote the price
of an asset or an index by X(t), then the log-return at time scale ∆t is defined
as rt = ln (X(t)/X(t−∆t)). Empirical studies show that the distribution of log-
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Figure 1. Left: Sequence of 10min returns of the S&P 500 index (top), 1month
returns (middle), and a realisation of a Gaussian random walk for comparison. Right:
Linear-log plots of the probability distribution for the normalized S&P500 returns.
The solid lines are power-law fits with exponents 1 + α ≈ 4. Figures taken from [39].
returns has power-law tails with exponents between 3 and 5 ‡[39]. Another interesting
feature which is observed in financial markets is the so-called volatility clustering:
while the correlation of returns decays relatively quickly in time, the correlation of
the absolute log-returns, defined as C|r|(τ) = 〈|r(t+ τ)||r(t)|〉, follows a long-range
power-law distribution with an exponent ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 [56, 54]. Non-Gaussian
distributions are also observed when looking at the trading volume or the number of
trades per time. We illustrate these observations in Fig. 1, where a financial time-
series with a characteristic non-Gaussian behaviour is shown, along with its algebraically
decaying return distribution.
Given the abundance of financial data physicists have become involved in the analysis
of time series of markets, as well as in research aiming to model the processes generating
these data. This field at the borderline of statistical physics, econometrics and financial
mathematics is now known as econophysics [14]. The attempts to model financial
markets here roughly fall into two classes, phenomenological models and agent-based
approaches. In the next section we will briefly discuss both, and then concentrate on
the latter agent-based approach, as mentioned in the introduction. We will here mostly
focus on qualitative aspects, and will not enter mathematical details of the various
models. For a recent textbook on mathematical aspects of MGs and related models see
also [24].
‡ This result holds for different time scales ∆t.
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3. The agent-based approach
3.1. Random walks and other phenomenological models
Many approaches to anomalous statistical properties of financial data are based on direct
modelling of stock market indices as stochastic processes. Such models do not deal with
the market on a microscopic level, i.e. with individual agents, but with aggregate
quantities only, such as the stock market indices, their return statistics and fluctuations
on a macroscopic level. The very first of such theories dates back to Bachelier’s ‘The´orie
de la Spe´culation’ from 1900 [5] and describes the stochastic evolution of market indices
as simple Gaussian random walks. While it is now well established that market data
is fundamentally non-Gaussian, Bachelier’s theory of financial markets as log-normal
random walks still forms the basis of many phenomenological approaches to finance.
Most notably, the Black-Scholes theory [12] commonly used for the pricing of financial
derivatives relies entirely on Gaussian assumptions, and hence on Bachelier’s approach.
More realistic approaches to finance with stochastic processes are of course no longer
based on purely Gaussian processes, but use Le´vy flights and related processes to model
the temporal evolution of financial indicators [11]. Many different classes of stochastic
processes have here been used, partially relying on the fact that multiplicative as opposed
to additive Gaussian noise directly leads to power-law behaviour.
3.2. Agent-based models
While phenomenological models can describe many features observed in real markets,
they are at least to some extent not fully satisfactory in that they do not allow for
a derivation of global quantities from the most basic level of description, namely the
direct interaction between agents. These phenomenological and agent-based approaches
are, to some degree, analogous to the description of physical phenomena through
thermodynamics and statistical physics respectively. While the laws of thermodynamics,
such as for example the phenomenological equation describing an ideal gas, find their
justification mostly in the purely empirical observation, only a direct kinetic theory
allows for a description on the level of individual molecules. During 19th century
such a kinetic theory was being developed, starting from Newton’s laws and using
probabilistic arguments, and results from thermodynamics were re-derived from first
principles, marking the beginning of statistical mechanics.
One can think of phenomenological models of financial markets as the analogue of the
description of physical phenomena on the level of thermodynamics. Empirical laws like
the ideal gas equation here correspond to the stylised facts empirically found in time
series of financial markets. The aim of phenomenological models is thus, in essence, to
devise and study stochastic processes for macroscopic observables, without considering
the detailed microscopic interaction which bring about the global phenomena.
The counterpart of statistical mechanics would then be given by models which start
from the level of the individual interacting particles of a financial market, i.e. the
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traders. While in physics particles can be considered the basic elements, in markets this
role is played by financial agents. The objective of statistical mechanics approaches
to financial markets is thus to study the interactions between individual agents,
and to derive equations describing global quantities from these microscopic rules of
engagement. Naturally the analogy between particles and agents is limited, for example
because agents are intelligent and particles are of course not. However, concepts and
techniques from physics can be transferred to the study of agent-based systems, which
mathematically turn out to be surprisingly similar to models of statistical physics.
The remainder of this review will focus on agent-based models. These allow one to
address fundamental questions for example as to where anomalous fluctuations may
actually come from on the level of the behaviour of the agents. Agent-based models of
financial markets have attracted substantial attraction, both in the economics and in
the physics communities. They easily accessible by computer simulations, so that effects
of changes in the rules of engagement of the agents, the ecology of the model-market or
variations in external control parameters are readily examined. The role of physicists
has here mostly been to devise simple minimalist models of financial markets, which are
also accessible analytically and conceptually by tools of statistical mechanics.
4. Minority Games and related models
4.1. Introduction
Neoclassical economics usually assumes that agents have perfect, logic and deductive
rationality, as well as full information about the market [78, 62, 71]. This implies,
among other things, that they are homogeneous and that they act always in the best
possible way. Common sense suggests that this view is quite far from reality and for
different reasons people are neither completely rational nor deductive and homogeneous.
Starting from this observation, leading economist Brian Arthur introduced a very simple
model, now known as the ‘El Farol bar problem’, to illustrate bounded rationality and
inductive reasoning. In Arthur’s model agents have only limited information and modes
of reacting to it at hand, and learn inductively from past experience. The mathematical
abstraction of this model resulted in the Minority Game (MG) [19], which now also
serves as one of the most popular toy models for financial markets.
Despite its simplicity, the MG exhibits a very rich behaviour, with phases in which the
resulting model-market behaves fully inefficiently and others in which the time-series
generated by the market still has some information-content, leading to an effective
predictability. As a function of the model parameters, the agents can either co-operate
successfully and achieve total gains higher than if they were to play at random, or in
other regimes fail to adapt successfully, resulting in high losses.
In its original formulation the statistics of the MG are mostly Gaussian (if large
populations of agents are considered), and there are no signs of volatility clustering
and other stylised facts in the time-series generated by the most basic MGs. Small
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modifications, however, can produce the fat tailed distributions similar to those observed
in financial markets. Apart from the appeal of the MG as a market model, it has also
attracted a significant interest as a model of statistical mechanics, and the methods of
theoretical spin glass physics have been seen to provide insight into its phase behaviour,
and have revealed new types of global co-operation, complexity and phase transitions,
previously unknown in models of disordered systems theory [18, 24].
4.2. Definition of the MG model
The MG is a mathematical abstraction of the El-Farol bar problem. In the latter a
group of say 100 agents have to decide whether or not to attend a bar at a given night
every week. In general people will only enjoy being at the bar if not more than say 60
people attend that night, as otherwise the bar will be too crowded. Every agent has to
decide independently every week whether to go or not, and has to make that decision on
the basis of the time-series of previous attendances. El-Farol agents in Arthur’s model
are agents of bounded rationality who learn inductively. Each of them holds a set of
predictors, mapping the past attendances onto a future (predicted) one, and based on
these idiosyncratic predictions the individual agents decide on whether or not to attend
the bar.
The basic MG model describes this systems as a population of N agents (with N an
odd integer), in which every player i has to take a binary decision bi(t) ∈ {−1, 1} at
every time-step t. The total attendance is then computed as
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
bi(t), (1)
and agents who take the minority decision are rewarded after each round, that is if
the number of agents playing 1 is higher than the number of those playing −1 then
all −1-players are rewarded and vice versa. In order to take their decisions agents are
each equipped with a pool of S so-called ‘strategy tables’. Assuming that agents can
remember the correct minority decisions of the last M rounds, that is they can resolve
P = 2M different histories of the game, a strategy ais provides a map from all possible
M-step histories onto the binary set {−1, 1}, i. e.
ais : {1, 2..., P} → {−1, 1}. (2)
In order to take their trading decisions agents follow an inductive learning dynamics.
They are limited to the strategies assigned to them at the beginning of the game,
reflecting the boundedness of their rationality. These strategy assignments are typically
generated at random, and result in a heterogeneous population of traders. At each time
step each agent has to choose which of his strategy tables to use, and the agents do so
by learning from past experience. A score Ui,s (utility function in terms of economics)
is assigned to each strategy table and updated at each step of the game as follows:
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− a
µ(t)
i,s A(t). (3)
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Here a
µ(t)
i,s is the action prescribed by the strategy s of agent i when the history µ(t)
occurs. The term−a
µ(t)
i,s A(t) reflects the minority rule: when a
µ(t)
i,s and A(t) have opposite
signs, i.e. if the strategy predicted the correct minority decision, then the strategy score
Ui,s is increased. If a
µ(t)
i,s A(t) > 0, the score is decreased. Each agent then at each time
step uses the strategy table in his pool of strategies with the highest score, i.e. the one
that would have performed best so far, had this particular player always used the same
strategy. In case of equal scores between some strategies, the agent chooses between
those at random.
4.3. Motivation as market model and price process
The MG can be understood as a simplified emulation of a financial market. The
binary decisions of the agents are interpreted as ‘buying’ versus ‘selling’, and hence
the aggregate action corresponds to an ‘excess demand’ in this model market, and leads
to movements of the (logarithmic) price. More precisely, if p(t) is the price of the
good traded on the MG-market, then log p(t+ 1) = log p(t) + A(t)
λ
, with A(t) the above
aggregate action A(t) =
∑N
i=1 bi(t). λ here reflects the liquidity of the market and
represents a proportionality constant. Traders in the MG take their decisions based on
commonly available information, which may be related to the past price history of the
market under consideration or to information provided externally. The payoff structure
of the MG can here be derived from expectations of the agents on future price evolution
[59]. Minority game agents effectively correspond to contrarian traders who expect the
price to go down in step t + 1 if it went up in step t. It is straightforward to extend
the model to majority game or mixed minority/majority games (in which some agents
play an minority game, and others a majority game) [28, 24]. Majority game agents
here represent so-called ‘trend-followers’ in a real market, their expectation is that the
price movement of time step t + 1 will be in the same direction as at time t, so that it
is favourable to buy when the majority of players is buying, and to sell whenever the
majority is selling.
4.4. Behaviour and main feature of the MG
We will now turn to a brief discussion of the main phenomenology of the MG. While it
follows directly from symmetry arguments that the time average of total bid vanishes
for large system sizes (i.e. < A(t) >= 0), the fluctuations of A(t) display a remarkably
complex behaviour when looked at as a function of the memory capacities of the agents.
It was observed in [69] that the ratio α = P/N is the relevant scaling parameter of the
model, i.e. that σ2/N = < A(t)2 >/N § and other observables depend on the memory
length M = log2 P and the system size only through the ratio α = P/N . The variance
σ2 of A(t), also referred to as the volatility is a measure for the efficiency of the game in
§ Here < . . . > stands for a temporal average, while · · · is the notation used for an average over the
quenched disorder, i.e the strategy assignments.
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Figure 2. (Colour on-line) Left: Predictability as a function of α for the standard
MG for tabula rasa starts (open markers) and biased initial conditions (solid markers).
Right: Volatility.
terms of co-operation and global gain. The smaller σ2 the smaller is the group of losing
agents (i.e. the majority group), with A(t) ≈ 0 (i.e. σ2 ≈ 0) corresponding to a situation
in which close to half of the agents take either trading decision, i.e. with roughly N/2
agents losing and the other N/2 agents winners (up to corrections to lower order in N).
A detailed analysis shows that the global gains are in fact given by −σ2, due to the
inherent negative-sum character of the MG global gains are always non-positive.
The behaviour of the re-scaled volatility σ2/N as a function of α is depicted in Fig.
2. For large α one finds σ2/N ≈ 1 which corresponds to the so-called ‘random trading
limit’. As α is decreased one finds a minimum of σ2/N at intermediate α, and a large
volatility σ2/N > 1 as α → 0 (for zero initial conditions). In this regime the co-
operation among MG agents is worse than the random trading limit, mostly due to
collective motion of whole crowds of agents taking the same trading decision (and of the
corresponding anti-crowds) [46, 44, 45].
Further insight can be obtained by defining the quantity
H =
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 , (4)
where the < A|µ > is the average of A conditional to the occurrence of a particular
history string µ. H is here a measure for the predictability of the system: if < A|µ > 6= 0
for at least one µ then the system is predictable (in a probabilistic sense). H = 0 thus
corresponds to a fully information-efficient market, in which no exploitable information
is contained in the market’s time series. If H > 0, however, statistical predictability is
present, and the market is not operating at full information efficiency.
Plotting H/N as a function of α (see Fig. 2) one finds that the value αc marking the
minimum of σ2/N corresponds to a transition point between a predictable phase at
α > αc and a fully information-efficient one at α < αc.
At the same time, αc also marks an ergodic/non-ergodic phase transition. This can
be demonstrated upon plotting the volatility σ2/N as a function of α obtained from
Anomalous fluctuations Minority Games and related multi-agent models 10
simulations of the MG learning dynamics started from different initial conditions. One
here distinguishes so-called ‘tabula rasa’ initial conditions, for which all strategy scores
are set to zero at the beginning of the game, and so-called ‘biased starts’, where some
strategies receive random non-zero score valuations Uis(t = 0) = ±u0 at the beginning
(with u0 ∼ O(1)). A corresponding plot is shown in Fig. 2, and demonstrates that the
system is insensitive to initial conditions above αc, but that the starting point becomes
relevant in the information-efficient phase below the phase transition.
4.5. The statistical mechanics approach
Since its mathematical formulation in 1997 [19] the MG has attracted significant
attention in the statistical physics community. In particular it has been found that
the MG is accessible by the tools of the theory of disordered systems and spin-glasses
[67, 32], and that its phase diagram and key observables can be computed either exactly
or in good approximation by methods of equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical
mechanics. The analogy to disordered systems, which have studied in the spin-glass
and neural networks communities for 30 years, is here threefold: firstly, the random
strategy assignments which are drawn at the start of the MG and through which the
agents interact with each other correspond to ‘quenched disorder’ in statistical physics,
that is frozen, fixed interactions between the microscopic degrees of freedom. In spin
glasses the interactions are specified by the couplings between magnetic spins, in neural
networks they are reflected by fixed synaptic structures governing the firing patterns of
the network of neurons. Secondly, the MG displays global frustration (not everybody
can win), similar to spin-glass models where not all interactions between spins can be
satisfied. Thirdly, in the MG every agent interacts with everybody else (through the
observation of the aggregate action A(t) =
∑
i bi(t) which is used to update strategy
scores). This makes the MG a ‘mean-field’ model in the language of physics, and tools
to address such systems are readily available.
We will here not enter the details of the mathematical analysis of the MG, but would only
like to mention briefly that it can be addressed by both static methods such as replica
techniques [67], and by dynamical approaches relying on path-integrals and dynamical
generating functionals [24, 40]. We will briefly sketch the ideas of both approaches in
the following two subsections.
4.5.1. Statics: replica theory The starting point of the static replica approach to
the standard MG is the function H as defined above [18]. Although H is not an
exact Lyapunov function of the MG learning dynamics, H can be seen as a ‘pseudo-
Hamiltonian’, with the ergodic stationary states of the MG corresponding to extrema
of H . If one restricts the discussion to a two-strategy MG (that is each agent i holds
only two strategy tables ais with s = ±1), then H turns out to be given by
H =
1
αN
αN∑
µ=1
(∑
i
{ωµi + ξ
µ
i mi}
)2
(5)
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where ξµi =
1
2
(aµi,1−a
µ
i,−1) and ω
µ
i =
1
2
(aµi,1+a
µ
i,−1). The {mi} are here soft spin variables
mi ∈ [−1, 1] and (up to normalisation) correspond to the relative frequencies with which
each player employs each of his two strategies.
H as defined above is a random function in that it depends on the {ξµi , ω
µ
i }, which reflect
the random strategy assignments at the beginning of the game. In the language of spin-
glass physics, H contains quenched disorder. Information about the stationary states
of the MG can then be obtained upon minimising H with respect to the microscopic
degrees of freedom {mi}. The starting point is the partition function
Z =
∫ 1
−1
dm1 · · · dmN exp (−βH(m1, . . . , mN)) (6)
where the ‘annealing temperature’ T = 1/β is taken to zero eventually to obtain the
minima of H ,
min H = − lim
β→∞
1
β
lnZ. (7)
The explicit analytical computation of the partition function for any particular
assignment of the strategy vectors this an insurmountable task, due to complex
interaction and global frustration. One hence restricts to an effective average · · · over
the disorder, and considers typical minima of H
min H = − lim
β→0
1
β
lnZ. (8)
The disorder-average of the logarithm of the partition function can here be obtained
using a replica-approach, as it is standard in spin-glass physics. In particular one has
f = − lim
n→0
lim
β→0
lim
N→∞
1
βNn
(
Zn − 1
)
(9)
for the free energy density in the thermodynamic limit. Zn here corresponds to an
n-fold replicated system, the disorder-average generates an effective coupling between
the different replicas.
The further mathematical steps are tedious, but straightforward, and we will not
report details here [18, 24, 61], but will only mention that order parameters such as
limN→∞H/N and limN→∞ σ
2/N in the ergodic phase can be obtained exactly or in good
approximation from this approach. The location of the phase transition at αc = 0.3374...
can be identified exactly as the point at which the so-called ‘static susceptibility’
diverges, indicating the breakdown of the ergodic replica-symmetric theory.
4.5.2. Dynamics: generating functional analysis The dynamical approach based on
generating functionals deals directly with the learning dynamics of the agents, which
can be formulated as follows
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)−
1
N
ξ
µ(t)
i
∑
j
{
ω
µ(t)
j + ξ
µ(t)
j sgn[qj(t)]
}
, (10)
if qi(t) denotes the score difference qi(t) =
1
2
(ui,1(t)− ui,−1(t)) of player i’s two strategies
at time-step t in a two-strategy MG (a generalisation to S > 2 has recently been reported
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in [70]). Note that only this difference is relevant for the agent’s decision which of his
two look-up tables to use, and that at t he will choose the strategy with the higher-
score, i.e. strategy table −1 if qi(t) < 0 and strategy table +1 if qi(t) > 0. This may be
summarised as him playing strategy sgn[qi(t)] ∈ {−1, 1} at t, and hence taking trading
action ω
µ(t)
i + ξ
µ(t)
i sgn[qi(t)] (= a
µ(t)
i,+1 if qi(t) > 0 and = a
µ(t)
i,−1 if qi(t) < 0).
One the defines a dynamical analogue of the partition function as the generating
functional [40, 24, 25]
Z[ψ] =
∫ [∏
i,t
Dqi(t)
]
δ(equations of motion) exp
(
i
∑
it
ψi(t)sgn[qi(t)]
)
, (11)
where ‘equations of motion’ is an abbreviation for Eqs. (10) so that the delta-functions
restrict this path integral to all trajectories of the system allowed by the update
rules. ψi(t) is a source term, and allows one to compute correlation functions upon
differentiation with respect to the {ψi(t)}. Mathematically speaking Z[ψ] is the Fourier
transform of the probability measure in the space of dynamical paths corresponding
to the MG update rules, and contains all relevant information on the dynamics of
the system. Similarly to the replica approach the evaluation of Z[ψ] is intractable for
individual realisations of the disorder, but is carried out as an average over all possible
strategy assignments. This leads to a set of closed, but complicated equations for the
dynamical order parameters of the problem (the response and correlation functions),
from which one can proceed to compute stationary order parameters such as the
volatility or the predictability. We will not report these calculations here, but will only
mention that both approaches, the static replica theory and the dynamical generating
functional analysis, lead to identical expressions for the characteristic observables, and
ultimately deliver the same value for the phase transition point αc [24].
While there are still some mathematical subtleties to be resolved, the MG is now
essentially considered to be solved as its phase diagram and stationary states can be
computed exactly, and as valid and convincing approximations for the volatility are
available at least in the ergodic phase. Open questions mostly relate to the behaviour in
the non-ergodic phase, where the market is information-efficient (H = 0). Up to now,
no analytical solutions have been found here.
5. Anomalous fluctuations in Minority Games and other agent-based
models
5.1. General remarks
The MG in its most simple setup does not display stylised facts, such as anomalous
fluctuations or temporal correlations of the market volatility. On the contrary, return
distributions are either Gaussian or of an unrealistic multi-peak shape (due to global
oscillations of the system), see Fig. 3. Within the minimalist approach of statistical
mechanics it is then natural to ask what features need to be added to produce more
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Figure 3. Return distributions of standard MG, left: symmetric phase (α ≈ 0.01),
right asymmetric phase (α ≈ 2). Red line in right panel represents a fit to a Gaussian
distribution.
realism. It here turns out that an evolving trading volume appears to be crucial.
While in the standard MG every agent trades precisely one unit at every time to make
the total trading volume equal to the number N of agents, two approaches have been
pursued which allow for dynamically evolving trading volumes. These are referred to as
grand canonical MGs (GCMG) [21, 22] and MGs with dynamically evolving capitals [16]
respectively and will be detailed in the following section. GCMG here refers to MGs in
which each agent is given the option to abstain at any given trading period. If they decide
to trade they still trade one unit, but due to the number of active agents fluctuating in
time, the total trading volume will evolve accordingly. The second approach consists in
MGs with dynamically evolving capitals, that is the wealth of each agent evolves in time
according to his success or otherwise in the game, and it is assumed that the amount
traded by a given agent is proportional to his wealth at the time. Since the wealths
change over time so does the trading volume.
We note at this stage that this tracing back of the emergence of stylised facts to a
modulated total trading volume can be criticized, as liquidity effects normally also need
to be taken into account in real markets. If one assumes that the total trading action
A(t) is related to the evolution of the (logarithmic) price via log p(t+1) = log p(t)+ A(t)
λ
,
then the role of the liquidity λ needs to be considered carefully. It controls the impact
of the excess demand A(t) on the price returns, and may well vary in time as well, i.e.
λ = λ(t). We will here disregard this fact, and will describe the emergence of stylised
facts in GCMGs and MGs with dynamical capitals in the following section, before we
then turn to a discussion of anomalous fluctuations in agent-based models different from
the MG.
5.2. Anomalous fluctuations in MGs
5.2.1. Grand canonical MGs In grand-canonical MGs agents are equipped with S ≥ 1
‘active’ strategies, that is strategy tables with binary entries {−1, 1} for each history,
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Figure 4. Phase diagram of the grand-canonical MG. Stylised facts are observed in
finite systems in a region around the efficient phase of the infinite-size model.
prescribing to buy or sell. Furthermore they each hold one null-strategy, i.e. a trivial
strategy which prescribes to abstain for any given history-string (aµis ≡ 0). For each
of these S + 1 strategies they then keep score values as usual and play the one with
the highest score at any time-step. An additional parameter ε is here introduced, and
plays the role of a disincentive for the players to be active. This is implemented by
subtracting an amount ε of the score of any strategy but the zero one at any time step,
so that the score update rules for the ‘active’ strategies read
Uis(t+ 1) = Uis(t)− a
µ(t)
is A
µ(t) − ε. (12)
The zero-strategy will always carry score zero. Thus agents trade only if the marginal
payoff from trading exceeds a threshold ε. Modifying ε thus can be understood as
introducing a trading fee to the model [9]. Since the MG by definition is a negative-sum
game (i.e. the sum of all payoffs is negative), agents loose on average when trading (only
a minority of players wins at every time step). Thus in the long-run all traders would
stop trading in the grand-canonical setup. To maintain trading activity one usually
couples the above group of ‘speculators’ (that is agents who have the option to abstain)
to a background of so-called ‘producers’. The latter are endowed with only one non-zero
strategy, and do not have the option not to trade, even if in the long run they lose money
on the MG market. They are considered producers who make their profits from trading
outside the model, and who are forced to be active on the MG market no matter what
(e.g. internationally operating co-operations who need to be active in currency markets,
but make their profits elsewhere).
The resulting phase diagram of the model at a fixed relative number of speculators and
producers is shown in Fig. 4 in the (α, ε)-plane. For ε = 0 one observes the standard
transition of the MG, between an unpredictable phase and a predictable one. The
unpredictable phase (in which H = 0) is marked by a red line in Fig. 4 and extends
from some value αc (which depends on the composition of the population of agents, i.e.
the relative concentrations of producers and speculators) to smaller α. Here the system
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Figure 6. Return fluctuations and total wealth of the population of traders in an MG
with dynamical capitals. From [16].
is in a non-ergodic state, the so-called turbulent regime. For ε 6= 0 this transition
is absent and the model market is predictable for all α. Generally the predictability
vanishes as H ∼ ε2 as ε→ 0 for α < αc.
The above phase diagram is obtained from the statistical mechanics theory in the
thermodynamic limit N → ∞, and anomalous behaviour can at most be expected for
parameters corresponding to the red line in Fig. 4 in the infinite system. Simulations
show, however, that anomalous fluctuations are observed in finite system in a ‘critical
region’ around the critical line, as indicated by the gray area in Fig. 4. Examples of
corresponding time-series are in this critical region are shown in Fig. 5. As the system
size is increased this critical region shrinks, and finally reduces to the critical line of the
infinite system as the number of players diverges.
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5.2.2. MGs with evolving capitals In MGs with dynamical capitals each agent i in
addition to his S strategies (all different from the null strategy) holds a wealth ci(t)
which evolves in time depending on his success or otherwise during trading. It is then
assumed that he invests a constant fraction γ of this capital ci(t) at time t. The evolution
of the capital of player i is then given by
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t)− γci(t)bi
A(t)
V (t)
, (13)
with V (t) the total trading volume, A(t) the excess demand at time t, and bi(t) player
i’s trading decision at time t. The minus sign again reflects the minority game payoff.
As in the GCMG one couples the group of speculative traders (whose volume is taken
to evolve in time according to the above rule) to a group of producers, who each trade
a constant volume. This model was studied in [16], and it was seen that the standard
transition of the MG is preserved when introducing dynamical capitals (as illustrated in
Fig. 6). At low α the system is in an efficient phase, which turns out to be an absorbing
state of the dynamics. Above a critical value of α the dynamics do not approach a fixed
point, and one finds H > 0, just as in the standard MG with fixed wealth. The overall
wealth of the population attains a maximum at αc as shown in Fig. 6. We note here
that results of [16] rely mostly on simulations, as an analytical solution of MGs with
dynamical capitals and S > 1 strategies per player is tedious due to the presence of fast
degrees of freedom (decisions which strategy to use) as well as slow ones (the capitals),
requiring an adiabatic decoupling. A theory for model with dynamical capitals and only
S = 1 strategy per player is in progress [34], and shows that the standard MG transition
is present also in this simplified system.
Similar to the observations in the GCMG simulations reveal the emergence of anomalous
fluctuations in finite systems in a region around αc. This is illustrated in Fig. 7, where
the autocorrelation of absolute returns is shown and seen to exhibit algebraic decay,
indicating long-range volatility correlations. At the same time return distributions close
to the critical point are strongly non-Gaussian (see right panel of Fig. 7). While
these distributions are essentially Gaussian far away from the critical point, they attain
fatter and fatter tails as αc is approached (from above), so that the kurtosis of these
distributions may well be seen as measure of the distance from the critical point.
5.3. Other market models
The MG is only one out of many market agent-based models developed in recent years,
and although this topical review mostly focuses on the MG, we will provide a brief list
of other models, without claiming to be exhaustive.
We will firstly discuss some close cousins of the MG, then briefly mention market models
which are conceptionally different. We here partly lean on the more extensive reviews
[52] and [43, 55].
While the MG is a ‘one-step’ game, i.e. a model in which all trading action takes place
in a single step, this may seem incompatible with speculative market which have an
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intrinsic intertemporal nature: buying at a price p(t) is only profitable if one is able to
sell at a higher price p(t1) where t1 > t. This lead the authors of [38, 10] as well as
Andersen and Sornette [1] to use a different payoff function,
gi(t+ 1) = ai(t)A(t + 1). (14)
The model of [1] is here also known as the ‘dollar game’. Payoffs of the form of (14)
imply that strategies involve two periods of time. The dynamics induced by this is
characterized by different regimes in which the minority and majority nature of the
interaction alternate [30]. However the majority rule prevails more often and gives rise
to a phenomenon quite similar to bubble phases in real markets. See also [15] for an
extension of MGs to multi-step models.
Agent based models can roughly be divided into two classes: few-strategy and many-
strategy models. When they first were introduced, models of financial markets were
intended to recreate the situation observed in real markets as closely as possible and
for this reason they were called ‘artificial financial markets’. Initially the main purpose
of these models was to carefully analyze a small number of strategies used by agents,
which is why they are referred to as few-strategies models. Example of such models
are those by Kirman [49] and by Frankel and Froot [31]. Concepts such as chartist and
fundamentalist behaviour were first introduced in the context of agent-based simulation
in these models.
In many-strategy models, on the other hand, the dynamic ecology of strategies is studied
with the aim of understanding their co-evolution over time and to see what strategies
will survive and which will die. The Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (SF-ASM) [3, 50]
is probably the most known example of this type of models. Its main objective is
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to characterise the conditions under which the market converges to an equilibrium of
rational expectations. In the Genoa artificial stock market [68] randomly chosen traders
place a limit buy or sell order (see also [11] for further details) according their budget
limitation, and they show herding behavior similar to the one studied in the Cont-
Bouchaud model [23]. We would also like to mention the Levy-Levy-Solomon model
[53, 55] in which agents can switch between a risky asset and a riskless bond and do
not use complicated strategies, but try to maximize a one-period utility function which
implies a wealth-dependent impact of agents on prices, in contrast with the other models
mentioned. Strategy switching, finally is at the centre of the model by Lux and Marchesi
[57]. In this model a mixed population of noise traders (who can either be optimistic or
pessimistic), and so-called fundamentalists is studied. Agents can then switch between
these groups dynamically. Finally, there are of course other market models which deserve
mentioning in principle, but which we can not list here due to space limitations.
With this plethora of models at hand, all or at least most of which in some regions
of their respective parameter spaces reproduce market-like stylised facts it is of course
legitimate to ask for a justification for this variety of models, and ultimately for a
selection among them. Apart from its application as a model of a market, the MG
presumably has its own right as a spin glass system and has introduced new types of
complexity and phase transitions to the theory of disordered systems. Its appeal thus
rests, as pointed out already above, in its position at the boundary of a realistic (within
reason), though analytically solvable complex system.
6. Towards more realism: heterogeneous populations of agents
6.1. General remarks
One of the main drawbacks of the MG as a market model is its simple set-up. Apart
from the random assignments of strategies there is no heterogeneity in the different
types of agents, whereas real markets are composed of different groups of traders, with
different objectives, impact on the market, and trading behaviour. The two extensions
mentioned above (GCMG and MGs with dynamical capitals) alleviate these constraints,
but more variety and extensions are possible and have been studied by various authors
over the last years. We summarise some of them in the following sections.
6.2. Mixed majority and minority games
Most notably, extensions towards mixed minority and majority games have been studied
in [28], in order to emulate mixed populations of trend-followers and contrarians. As
mentioned above, MG mechanisms can be derived from expectations of agents on the
future price movements, assuming contrarian behaviour. MG agents expect the price
to go down in the future if it went up in the past, and vice versa. Hence they prefer
minority trading. Trend-followers on the other hand assume that the tendency in price
movements will continue, hence if the price is rising due to positive excess demand, they
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different proportions of trend-followers and contrarians. f denotes the fraction of
majority games players (trend-followers). From [28].
will buy (and analogously sell when the price is going down), and behave as majority
game players. Pure majority games are trivial in the sense that all agents agree to either
buy collectively at all times or to sell, so that all agents are frozen. The model itself
is closely related to the Hopfield model of neural networks, and is interesting from a
statistical mechanics point of view [48]. A mixed minority/majority game was studied
in [28], where a population of fN majority game players and (1 − f)N minority game
players is considered (0 ≤ f ≤ 1). Trend followers are here taken to follow a learning
rule
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t) + a
µ(t)
i,s A(t) (15)
where the only difference between (15) and (3) is the sign in front of the term a
µ(t)
i,s A(t).
The main results regarding this model are the findings that the presence of trend-
followers (a) injects information into the system (in particular an informationally
efficient phase with H = 0 is present only for f < 0.5), and (b) increases the fluctuations
at low α (see curves for f > 1/2 in Fig. 8. A further generalization of the mixed-model
can be found in [27, 77] where players have a payoff function for their strategies given
by
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t) + a
µ(t)
i,s F (A(t)) (16)
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with F (A) = A − ǫA3 in [27] (ǫ being a parameter of the model) and F (A) =
A(t)(χ(|A| < L) − χ(|A| > L) in [77] where χ(B) = 1 if B is true (and 0 otherwise)
and L is a parameter of the model. This kind of choice allows a player to change
his behaviour from contrarian to trend follower and vice versa in time, depending on
the current price movement. In some phases of these models interesting features are
observed (e.g. trends, bubbles and volatility clustering), we point the reader to the
literature for further details.
6.3. MG as a platform for simulation of a future market
The application of the MG as a platform to study ecologies of traders can be extended
to the simulational study of markets. Current work by two of the authors [35, 36]
for example uses MG-based simulations to study the influence of different trading
parameters on the overall performance of different groups of traders in a market of
futures. Large scale simulations with a variety of traders here allow one to study
the interaction between different groups of traders in detail. In particular diverse
populations of short-term and long-term traders are considered, agents with different
weights are taken into account, and a distinction between direct traders and broker
represented agents can be made. In Fig. 9 we show results from simulations of a market
with 200 tick traders (all contrarian), 50 long-term speculators, 50 broker represented
long-term speculators and 1000 broker represented (background) traders. While we
here depict only results regarding the influence of a trading fee, the effect of external
market parameters such as so-called ‘tick size’ and ‘tick value’ parameters and their
interdependence can be studied as well. Details will be reported elsewhere [36]. Note
also some recent work on the effects of Tobin taxes in MG markets [9] in this context.
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7. Use of information in Minority Games and related models
A further unrealistic simplification is the assumption of uniform available information
and equal intellectual capacities of all agents, usually made in simple setups of the MG.
More accurate models can here be expected to be more diverse and should account for
heterogeneity in these aspects. In particular issues of individually different memory
capacities and access to information are here to be considered, the latter leading to
models with so-called ‘private information’.
7.1. An agent-based model with private information
A model with private information has been considered in [8] and [26]. Although the
model studied there is not directly derived from the MG, it shows similar features. The
model is based on the Shapley-Shubik [74] model of markets, and considers limitation to
private information explicitly. As in the MG one assumes the existence of a global state
of the market ω(t), which takes one of P = αN values at each time t (with N the number
of traders in the market), but that agents have access to this information only through
individual information filters kωi , where i labels the individual agents. On the basis of
the external signal ω agent i receives ‘filtered’ information kωi which may hence vary
across the population of agents. In the simple setup of [8] and [26] the {kωi } take only
binary values kωi ∈ {−1, 1}. The state ω is also assumed to determine the (quenched
random) return Rω of an underlying asset traded on the model market. Thus the vector
ki = (k
1
i , . . . , k
P
i ) crucially constrains the ability of agent i to resolve different states
of the market. If for example kωi = −1 for all ω then agent i is completely blind with
respect to the actual state of the market, he receives information −1 no matter what the
actual value of ω(t) and hence cannot distinguish any two different information patterns.
If kωi is highly correlated with R
ω (e.g kωi = 1 whenever the return R
ω is positive, and
kωi = −1 for all ω for which R
ω is negative), then agent i is very well able to distinguish
states of the market, and to make accurate predictions on the further price movements.
A detailed statistical mechanics analysis shows that the phase transition of the MG
market model is present also in this context, see Fig. 10. There we plot the resulting
predictability H as a function of α for different choices of other model parameters
(not specified here), note in particular that the model can again be solved exactly
(solid lines in the figure). The right panel of Fig. 10 depicts an order parameter q
which measures the degree to which agents use their privately obtained information.
At the phase transition q is maximal, and the agents’ decisions crucially depend on the
information they receive. At large or low values of α much less use of the available
information is made, and agents essentially trade independently of the received binary
private information.
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7.2. MG with dynamics on heterogeneous time-scales
7.2.1. Heterogeneous time-scales Agents in real markets can differ in time horizon
on which they act and on which they develop their own strategy. This point is often
neglected, although there is of course some work stressing this particular aspect of
real markets [65]. Very recently LeBaron pointed out that different time scales can be
responsible for the appearance of different beliefs on the market and the co-existence
of these beliefs helps to generate features across many time scales through symbiotic
effects [51]. In MGs there are several ways in which one can implement different time
scales among agents, for example through individual learning rates, score memories or
strategy correlation [63]. In 2-strategy MGs one can introduce correlation between the
strategies of any given agent by the drawing the strategy tables such that
P (aµi,1 = a
µ
i,−1) = c. (17)
In this setup, with probability c, the two strategies of any given player will prescribe
the same action as response to the appearance of history µ. Thus, if c = 0 player i’s
strategies are fully anti-correlated, aµi,1 = −a
µ
i,−1 for all µ. For c = 1/2 one recovers the
MG with uncorrelated strategies. For c = 1 each players holds two fully correlated (i.e.
identical strategies), and is an infinitely ‘slow’ player in the sense that his reaction to a
certain information pattern does not change over time. The smaller c the faster are the
agents, at least in the simplified picture of this model. In this setup, one is particularly
interested in the information ecology of the model, i.e. to understand whether groups
of different strategy correlation exploit each other, and can live in symbiosis. If two
different groups, say fast and slow, are introduced, with cf < cs where f, s stand for
fast and slow, the behaviour is already quite rich and can be studied exactly by means
of replica theory. Fig. 11 shows that gains γf , γs of fast and slow agents respectively,
depend in a highly non-trivial way on the fraction φf of fast players and the correlation
parameters cf , cs .
Another way to investigate the role of time scales in MGs is to study the game with just
one information pattern (i.e. the limit P → 1) [59, 60]. This limiting case is particularly
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straightforward to understand analytically. Given A(t) each agent i receives a payoff
−ai(t)A(t), and keeps a score ∆i(t) as follows
∆i(t + 1) = ∆i(t)−
A(t)
N
, (18)
and his trading action is then determined by the stochastic rule
P [ai(t+ 1) = 1] =
1 + Γi∆i(t)
2
(19)
with Γi a learning rate. Thus high values of ∆i(t) favour positive trading action
ai(t + 1) = 1 by player i. It is then possible to consider G groups of φgN agents
respectively (with g = 1, . . . , G and
∑N
g=1 φg = 1) with all the agents belonging group
g following a learning rule of rate Γg. Without going into any detail here, we will just
point out that the relative gains of the respective groups can be obtained as
γg − γ =
Γ− Γg
2(1 + Γ)
(20)
(within some approximation) where γg is the average gain of players in group g, γ the
gain averaged over all groups, and Γ the mean learning rate (over all groups). It is
interesting to observe that the smaller Γg the smaller the loss of group g. For details
and other extensions see [63].
7.2.2. Timing of adaptation The effects of the timing of adaptation on MGs have been
studied for example in [73, 33]. One here distinguishes between so-called ‘on-line’ and
‘batch’ adaptation of the MG agents. In the more usual ‘on-line’ games, agents adapt
to the external flow of information instantly, and update their strategy scores at every
round of the game, and then choose the trading strategy to use in the next step. In
batch games, agents adapt only after a large number of rounds has been played, and
the corresponding information regarding the performance of the strategies has been
accumulated. An interpolation between both cases is possible. Specifically, one allows
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the agents to update their scores (and re-adapt their strategy choices) only once every
M rounds (with accumulative increments over the past M rounds), i.e.
Ui,s(t +M) = Ui,s(t)−
1
M
M−1∑
ℓ=0
a
µ(ℓ)
i,s A
µ(ℓ)[{U(t)}]. (21)
Their choice of strategy then remains fixed in between two updates (as indicated by the
dependence of the total action on the scores at time t in Eq. (21)). The limit M → 1
reproduces the on-line case, the case M ≫ P (with P the number of possible values
of the information) is referred to as the ‘batch’ game, in which an effective average
over all information patterns is performed. While the volatility of standard MGs with
uncorrelated strategies is not sensitive to the choice of on-line versus batch dynamics,
qualitative differences are found in MGs with fully anti-correlated strategy assignments
(c = 0 in the notation of the previous section), see Fig. 12. Adaptation at randomly
chosen time-intervals of mean M finally reduces the volatility in the efficient phase of
the market, but not above the phase transition, see Fig. 13.
7.3. Cost of information
Ideally one would like to consider models in which agents can acquire information at
some cost, i.e in which they pay for the use of expertise. To the knowledge of the authors,
no such attempts have yet been made in an analytical statistical mechanics approach.
One may also consider models in which agents have both public and private information
at their disposal, and have to decide which to use. One may think of globally available
information through newspapers and other media, versus the recommendations of a
small circle of private advisors and/or friends.
8. Summary and outlook on future work
In summary we have reviewed the recent progress in the description of financial markets
through simple agent-based models, accessible by the techniques of theoretical statistical
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Figure 13. Volatility for model with random updates, probability to update 1/M .
Top panel corresponds to MG with uncorrelated strategy assignments, lower panel to
the fully anti-correlated case. From [33].
mechanics. The MG in particular can be seen as a minimalist market model, which can
be treated analytically in its basic setup and is now considered to be essentially fully
understood. While in its original setup of each agent trading one unit at any given time
step the MG does not display anomalous fluctuations and stylised facts as seen in real
market data, only minor modifications are necessary to make the model more realistic
in this sense, without giving up the analytical tractability. MGs with a finite number of
agents and with dynamical capitals and/or with an option of the agents to abstain have
been shown to display anomalous fluctuations close to their phase transitions, similarly
to systems of statistical mechanics exhibiting large scale correlations and self-similarity
near their critical points. These observations call for further analysis of such variants of
the MG, for example by means of renormalisation group techniques.
The MG can also serve as a platform for more diverse market simulations, and an ecology
of market participants can be studied upon introducing diversified types of players in the
MG. These may include contrarians and trend-followers respectively, as well as agents
trading on different time-scales and/or with different trading volumes, and agents of
different memory capacities. While it is presumably unlikely that real market trading
decisions can be taken on the basis of MG simulations, the model as such and its diverse
variants and extensions offer a promising approach to gain a better understanding of
the interplay of market parameters and the ecology of populations of traders, based on
models at the boundary of analytical solvability. Future research in this direction may
thus be of interest both in an academic environment as well as for practitioners.
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